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5 The End of Self-Regulation? Hedge Funds and Derivatives in Global 
Financial Governance 
Eric Helleiner and Stefano Pagliari 
 
This is a pre-publication version of a book chapter that appears in the volume ‘Global Finance in 
Crisis. The Politics of International Regulatory Change’, edited by E.Helleiner, S.Pagliari, and H. 
Zimmerman, Routledge 2009. If you wish to cite it please consult the final published version for 
the correct pagination. Full references can be found in the bibliography at the end of the volume. 
 
 
As noted in the introductory chapter, the global financial crisis that began in 2007 has produced 
an important shift in the balance of public-private responsibilities in international financial 
regulation. This paper examines two areas where this trend has been particularly dramatic: hedge 
funds and derivatives. Although these two sectors were put on the agenda of international 
regulatory bodies several times over the past two decades, policymakers decided not to take on 
the task of regulating them directly. They chose instead to rely on market discipline and self-
regulatory mechanisms designed by the financial industry. At the outset of the current crisis, the 
initial international regulatory response followed the same pattern. But in the fall of 2008 and 
spring of 2009, this situation suddenly changed as policymakers set out new international 
objectives to place the responsibility to regulate these two sectors squarely on the shoulders of 
public officials. Although hedge funds and derivatives played a very different role in generating 
the crisis, with the latter clearly at its core and the former being more a channel of transmission, 




What explains this transformation? We argue that it was primarily the result of a change in 
domestic politics within the United States, Britain and to some extent the rest of the European 
Union. In the past, the endorsement of market discipline and self-regulation in international rules 
was largely a product of the preferences of the US and Britain, as the two dominant powers in 
these sectors. During this crisis, their preferences changed as a result of three interconnected 
domestic developments: an unprecedented politicization of regulatory politics among the public 
and legislators, an ideational shift among elite policymakers, and new private sector support for 
regulation. Reinforcing these trends were pressures from other countries in the European Union, 
reflecting similar domestic shifts, as well as some longstanding reform objectives in the case of 
hedge funds. As these leading states’ policies moved in the same direction, their policymakers 
saw international coordination as useful for addressing the general public unease and the 
competitive consequences of unilateral regulation, as well as for locking in their preferred 
regulatory solution internationally. In our view, these explanations have some broader theoretical 
implications for literature on the politics of international financial regulation, most importantly 
that of demonstrating how the financial crisis reinforced the role of domestic politics in leading 
states as a key driver of international regulatory change. 
 
HEDGE FUNDS AND DERIVATIVES BEFORE THE CRISIS 
 
Hedge funds and derivatives were brought to the attention of policymakers well before the recent 
crisis by their rapid growth over the past two decades and by several episodes of financial 
instability throughout the 1990s involving these segments of global financial markets. After the 
collapse of the American fund Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) in 1998 in particular, 
the Basel Committee, IOSCO and especially the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) actively 
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debated the regulation of hedge funds. Derivatives have also been the subject of considerable 
discussion within IOSCO, the Basel Committee, and the Joint Forum since the 1990s. Before the 
current crisis, however, none of these bodies recommended that national authorities directly 
regulate the activities of hedge funds or derivatives markets. In the case of hedge funds, 
regulators focused their attention on the role of banks in providing these investment vehicles 
with credit (so called “indirect regulation”), while encouraging the funds and their bank 
counterparties to self-regulate and disclose greater information to the markets (FSF 2000, see 
also Eichengreen 2003, Robotti 2006). In the case of derivatives, international regulatory bodies 
refrained from recommending direct regulation of these markets and focused instead on tasks of 
strengthening supervisory cooperation, while encouraging private actors to regulate themselves 
(Tsingou 2006). 
 
The encouragement of market discipline and self-regulation by private industry groups in lieu of 
direct regulation was largely a product of the preferences of the two dominant financial powers 
in these markets: the United States and Britain. Although policymakers in some other countries 
were keen to see more formal regulation, these two states were able to veto international 
initiatives to move in that direction because hedge fund managers and derivatives dealers are 
heavily concentrated within their territories. US regulators opposed proposals to introduce 
mandatory disclosure requirements upon hedge funds advanced from the countries where the 
funds had been most active during the East Asian crisis, as well as other regulatory initiatives put 
forward by France and Germany after the collapse of LTCM (Eichengreen 2003, Robotti 2006). 
US authorities also opposed the regulation of derivatives markets, going so far as to support the 
passage of a bill in 2000 that locked in their domestic deregulatory environment by precluding 
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the regulation of over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives markets (that is, those negotiated privately 
on a bilateral basis between the buyer and the seller). British authorities were also skeptical of 
heavy-handed international regulatory initiatives and, within the European context, they also 
defended their financial industry from the various proposals to regulate coming from Brussels 
and continental European countries (Zimmermann in this volume). 
 
US and British opposition to formal regulation was motivated in part by competitive pressures, as 
officials in both countries worried that tighter domestic regulations could result in business 
fleeing to the other’s markets or offshore. Also important was the ideological orientation of US 
and British officials in this period, an orientation which left them skeptical of what direct 
regulatory intervention in the financial markets could achieve, and wary of the costs of 
regulation in terms of lost financial sector’s efficiency and profitability. In the case of hedge 
funds, US officials opposed disclosure requirements that would place the task of overseeing 
hedge funds upon the shoulder of supervisors, arguing that public authorities would not have the 
same capacity to process this information as financial market participants. Instead, they urged 
hedge funds to disclose more information to their counterparties and investors in order to 
delegate to market actors the task of supervising the funds’ activities (PWG 1999). In the case of 
derivatives, opposition to direct regulation reflected prevailing ideas among their financial 
policymakers about the virtues of the market-led securitization trend in which risks became 
increasingly commodified, bundled, sliced and diced. The growth of derivatives was a key part 
of this trend and its proponents – of whom Federal Reserve Chair Alan Greenspan was among 




The British and US positions also partly reflected the influence of industry groups. Like other 
parts of the financial industry, derivatives and hedge fund groups have benefited from close 
access to policymakers. The complex nature of these sectors has only strengthened the industry’s 
ability to shape the terms of the regulatory debate and to fend off regulation. Alongside their 
lobbying power, the private sector has also shown a capacity to promote and coordinate 
international self-regulatory initiatives in these two sectors. Notable examples are the initiatives 
of groups such as the G30, the global derivatives industry association (International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association), hedge funds’ bank counterparties groups (Counterparty Risk 
Management Policy Group) and hedge funds managers’ groups (Managed Funds Association, 
Hedge Fund Working Group, Asset Managers’ Committee, Alternative Investment Management 
Association) (see Coleman 2003, Tsingou 2006, Eichengreen 2003). When episodes of 
instability brought the regulation of hedge funds and derivatives onto the political agenda, these 
industry groups were constantly able to deflect official regulatory pressures through self-
regulatory efforts. 
 
THE CASE OF HEDGE FUNDS 
 
Given this past history, what changed in the recent crisis to bring hedge funds and derivatives 
under the umbrella of public international regulation? Let us first examine the case of hedge 
funds. The international emphasis on self-regulation, and indirect regulation of hedge funds that 
emerged after the collapse of LTCM also informed the initial reaction to the subprime mortgage 
crisis. When the regulation of hedge funds returned on the international regulatory agenda at the 
first leaders’ summit in November 2008, the G20 leaders did not depart from the traditional 
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support for self-regulation, inviting hedge funds bodies to “bring forward proposals for a set of 
unified best practices” (G20 2008: 4). 
 
The next G20 Summit at the leaders’ level in London on April 2 2009, however, represented a 
turning point. For the first time, direct regulation and oversight of hedge funds were endorsed at 
the international level when the G20 leaders agreed that: 
 
Hedge funds or their managers will be registered and will be required to disclose 
appropriate information on an ongoing basis to supervisors or regulators, including on 
their leverage, necessary for assessment of the systemic risks that they pose individually 
or collectively. Where appropriate, registration should be subject to a minimum size. 
They will be subject to oversight to ensure that they have adequate risk management. 
(G20 2009: 3) 
 
This agreement placed the task of overseeing the operation of hedge funds firmly on the 
shoulders of supervisors/regulators rather than on their bank counterparties. To achieve this goal, 
the G20 also called upon the FSF “to develop mechanisms for cooperation and information 
sharing between relevant authorities in order to ensure that effective oversight is maintained 
where a fund is located in a different jurisdiction from the manager” (G20 2009: 3). References 
to self-regulatory measures from the industry were noticeably absent. 
 




A central cause of this shift was a change in American domestic politics triggered by the 
increasing politicization of hedge funds regulation starting in the fall of 2008. The hedge fund 
industry had weathered the first year of the financial storm far better than other financial sectors 
and largely escaped public scrutiny, which focused instead on actors such as mortgage 
originators, banks, and credit rating agencies. Although the collapse in June 2007 of two hedge 
funds established by the US investment bank Bear Stearns had signaled the beginning of the 
crisis, US policymakers initially saw this development as merely a symptom of a larger problem 
whose origins lay elsewhere. This attitude came to an end in September 2008, however, when the 
convulsions in financial markets that followed the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers created a 
“perfect storm” that hedge funds could not weather. The prime brokers and investment banks 
that represented hedge funds’ traditional sources of leverage scaled back their lending, while the 
panic in the markets prompted many investors to withdraw their investments. Caught in the 
middle between the Scylla of the credit crunch and the Charybdis of large scale withdrawals by 
investors, most hedge funds were forced to quickly unwind positions, further fuelling declining 
asset prices in a pro-cyclical way. 
 
As it became clear that the activities of hedge funds were amplifying the crisis, the perception of 
hedge funds in the political debate progressively shifted from victims to villains. In particular, 
critics accused hedge funds of driving falls in stock markets and exacerbating the volatility in the 
markets and pointed the finger at their traditional high levels of leverage and their short-selling 
of stocks. Four days after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) placed temporary restrictions on short-selling, followed by securities 




The unprecedented politicization of financial regulatory politics within the US at this time and 
the increasing critiques directed towards hedge funds led the US Congress to pay attention to this 
sector. Five of the most highly compensated hedge fund managers were called to testify before 
the House Oversight Committee in November 2008, in a series of hearings that saw various top 
financiers questioned by US lawmakers over their roles in generating the crisis. In front of the 
mounting public scrutiny and Congressional activism, hedge fund associations sought to 
differentiate the image of the industry from what they described as the real culprit for the 
financial meltdown: the “regulated” banks. Hedge funds stressed how the size of the entire 
global hedge fund industry was smaller than the balance sheet of some banks, how they were less 
leveraged than banks, and, above all, how they had not required any bailouts despite the 
liquidation of 1471 funds in 2008. 
 
These efforts were not sufficient to prevent Congress from proposing legislative measures. In 
January 2009, two bipartisan bills were introduced in Congress with the goal of requiring hedge 
funds to register with the SEC and to grant federal regulators a greater role in monitoring the 
activities of hedge funds. Since the collapse of LTCM in 1998, there had been similar legislative 
attempts to regulate hedge funds but past initiatives were never brought up for consideration by 
the full House or Senate. The politicization of financial regulatory politics in late 2008/early 
2009, however, opened a window of opportunity for some key Congressmen to bring back on the 
Congressional agenda their proposals to regulate hedge funds. Moreover, this time they found a 





Since their confirmation hearings in January 2009 both Obama’s nominee to head of the SEC, 
Mary Schapiro, and the Treasury Secretary-nominee, Timothy Geithner, pledged to pursue 
mandatory registration of hedge funds with the SEC in order to subject funds to new disclosure 
requirements and inspections by the SEC’s staff. The new course of action charted by the US 
federal financial authorities represented not only a tactical recognition of the degree of 
Congressional and public concern, but also an broader shift in the approach to regulation that 
matured with the transition from the Bush administration to the Obama administration. In 
developing guidelines for the regulation of hedge funds and other private pool of capitals at the 
outset of the crisis, Bush’s Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and other federal regulators had 
emphasized that “market discipline of risk-taking is the rule and government regulation is the 
exception” (PWG 2007: 1). The blueprint for “Rebuilding Financial Regulation and 
Supervision” published by the new Treasury Secretary Geithner in June 2009 instead placed on 
the shoulders of regulators the task of overseeing and regulating not only hedge funds, but also 
every systemically important financial institution (US Government 2009b). The new proposal 
assigned to the SEC the power to gather information about hedge fund trades on a confidential 
basis and to share them with a systemic-risk regulator with the authority to place limits on their 
activities and leverage if they were deemed to pose systemic risks to the economy. 
 
The shift in US policy also reflected a change in the position of the hedge fund industry, which 
reversed its traditional opposition to greater regulatory oversight. To be sure, as in the past, 
hedge fund groups initially reacted to the regulatory threats generated by the financial crisis by 
renewing their self-regulatory efforts. Individual hedge fund associations released new voluntary 
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codes of best practices (see for example, MFA 2009a), and three of the four most important 
hedge fund groups announced in March 2009 their intention to work together towards a global 
set of standards for the industry. But at the beginning of 2009, the same hedge fund groups that 
had fought past attempts by the SEC to impose upon them a mandatory registration did not 
oppose this kind of regulatory intervention (MFA 2009b). 
 
The endorsement of regulation from the hedge funds industry was in part a defensive move. The 
aggressive Congressional activism and the election of the Obama administration sent the hedge 
fund industry the signal that escaping closer scrutiny from regulators was no longer tenable. 
While at the beginning of 2008, only eight per cent of US hedge fund managers expected 
increased regulation of the industry, this percentage raised to 98 per cent in February 2009 
(Rothstein Kass 2009). As the writing on the wall became clearer, hedge funds attempted to 
“lock in” the form of regulatory intervention they considered the most acceptable. Since most of 
the major US hedge fund managers already registered voluntarily with the SEC, mandatory 
registration was not too onerous. At the same time, they focused their lobbying efforts on 
preventing any limitations on their trading activities, such as a cap on leverage or capital 
requirements. Similarly, hedge fund associations came to accept the disclosure of information to 
the regulators on a confidential basis, while fighting against public disclosure of information that 
could shed light upon their investment strategies. 
 
The endorsement of regulation coming from the industry can also be seen in part as reflecting a 
shift of power brought by the crisis within the sector, with the hedge funds’ managers losing 
bargaining power vis-à-vis their investors. Since the fall of 2008, the poor performance of hedge 
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funds triggered an unprecedented outflow of investors. The difficulties in raising capital were 
further intensified after the arrest in December 2008 of Bernard Madoff for his $65 billion Ponzi 
scheme. Madoff was not a hedge fund manager; rather, he executed trades for other “feeder 
funds” through his brokerage firms. However, the scandal inflicted a further blow to the 
reputation of the hedge fund industry and intensified the concerns about their lack of oversight. 
Pension funds and other institutional investors took advantage of the weakness of hedge fund 
managers to turn the tables and demand more favourable fees, as well as greater transparency 
about hedge funds’ investments and valuation methods (see for example Karmin and Strasbourg 
2009). After the Madoff scandal, some hedge fund managers came to see a minimum level of 
regulation as a way to restore confidence in the industry and to stem the unprecedented 
hemorrhage of capital. As a hedge fund manager acknowledged, “This is an Enron moment for 
hedge funds … Regulation would be welcome, primarily from a trust standpoint” (quoted in 
Ivry, Kishan, Katz 2008). 
 
The Role of Europe 
 
Hedge funds in Europe were also able to weather the first year of the financial crisis relatively 
unscathed. During this time, European Commissioner Charles McCreevy repeatedly rejected 
calls to regulate them, and his strenuous defense of self-regulation was initially supported by the 
leaders of major European countries who endorsed a set of voluntary codes of best practices 
drafted by a group of 14 London-based hedge funds (UK Government 2008). However, 
beginning in the fall of 2008 McCreevy progressively reversed his position and gave way to a 
European directive regulating hedge funds. At the end of February 2009, McCreevy explained 
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this shift acknowledging that the financial crisis had “profoundly altered the economic and 
political context in which decisions on the regulation of hedge funds and private equity will be 
made. The ground has shifted in this debate. Closer direct regulatory and supervisory oversight 
of hedge funds and private equity is inevitable” (McCreevy 2009: 5). 
 
How did the financial crisis cause such a dramatic shift in the approach of the European 
Commission? As in the US, the politicization of financial regulatory politics triggered by the 
financial crisis had given strength to pro-regulation forces within the European Parliament. In 
September 2008, the European Parliament adopted by a vote of 562 to 86 a report drafted by the 
Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, President of the Party of European Socialists, demanding that the 
European Commission present a legislative proposal to regulate hedge funds and private equity 
funds. This forced Commissioner McCreevy to soften his opposition to regulating hedge funds 
and to launch a public consultation on this issue in December 2008. 
 
Even more significantly, McCreevy’s defense of the self-regulatory approach came under attack 
from those continental European countries that had favoured direct regulation of hedge funds 
before the crisis (Zimmermann in this volume). The politicization of financial regulation in the 
fall of 2008 opened a window of opportunity for French President Nicholas Sarkozy to push the 
regulation of hedge funds back on to the international agenda. This initiative was supported by 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel, who criticized British and US policymakers for having 
placed too much confidence in the self-regulation of financial markets and having thwarted the 
recommendations to regulate hedge funds directly advanced by Berlin during the German 
presidency of the G8 in 2007 (Erdem 2008). From the perspective of London and Washington, 
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the behavior of France and Germany was similar to a pugilist in a bar brawl: “You wait until a 
fight breaks out and then take a swing at the guy you have always wanted to hit, … whether or 
not he had anything to do with starting the fight is not the point” (quoted in Beattie 2009). 
 
However, the development that most significantly marked the end of self-regulation for hedge 
funds in Europe was the change in the position of Britain. Although London had traditionally 
been the most important advocate of the self-regulatory approach endorsed by McCreevy, in 
February 2009 the British Government agreed to lift its veto to a European regulation of hedge 
funds (Agence France Press 2009). This shift was not simply the result of French and German 
pressures but rather the product of a domestic shift provoked by the financial crisis, which made 
the traditional opposition of British officials to any change in the regulation of hedge funds 
politically untenable. 
 
As in the US, the British hedge fund industry was not able to escape the backlash against the 
City of London that followed the bailouts of some British banks, especially after it was revealed 
that some hedge funds had made profits for hundreds of millions of pounds by short-selling the 
stocks of those same financial institutions. When the British Financial Services Authority (FSA) 
placed a temporary ban on short-selling of financial stocks, Prime Minister Gordon Brown 
justified this decision arguing that “the interests of savers and homeowners and mortgage holders 
came before the interests of a few hedge funds” (quoted in Mackintosh 2008b). Moreover, while 
the FSA had at the beginning of the crisis defended the codes of best practices drafted by the 
London-based Hedge Fund Working Group, these self-regulatory measures came under attack in 
late January 2008 from the parliamentary Treasury Select Committee, which denounced the fact 
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that they had only attracted 34 signatories out of more than 400 British funds (UK Treasury 
Committee 2009). The March 2009 report of the chair of the FSA, Lord Turner, signaled a 
further intellectual shift in the approach of British authorities towards the regulation of the City 
of London. The Turner report recommended that the FSA request that London-based hedge fund 
managers disclose more information on their holdings and risk exposure. It also suggested that 
capital and liquidity requirements should be imposed if hedge funds started to pose systemic 
risks or became “bank-like” in their activities (FSA 2009, p. 75). 
 
Like its American counterpart, the British hedge fund industry did not oppose the greater level of 
oversight advocated by the Turner Report (HFSB 2009, AIMA 2009b). This position was driven 
in part by the recognition of the political momentum behind regulation and in part by the deep 
suspicion of the regulation being drafted by the European Commission. British hedge funds 
opposed a purely European response that could drive business away from London or undermine 
its competitiveness and called instead for a “global solution” (AIMA 2009a). When a European 
regulation of the industry became unavoidable, the British hedge funds formed a common front 
with the FSA to defend the British regulatory approach as the model to be emulated. This move 
was partially successful since the proposal advanced by the European Commission in April 2009 
to require all hedge fund managers operating in Europe to be authorised and regulated by a 
national regulator was closer to the manager-authorisation and supervision template already in 
place in Britain than to other proposals advanced by members of the European Parliament or 
policymakers from Continental European countries targeting the underlying funds. At the same 
time, hedge funds with the support of British authorities have fought to limit the regulatory, 
governance, and disclosure requirements – including capital requirements and leverage 
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restrictions – attached to this European “passport”, although the outcome of this battle is still 
largely to be defined at the time of our writing. 
 
With both Washington and London removing their veto to an internationally coordinated 
regulation of hedge funds, continental European countries were able to “lock in” the new British 
and US commitment at the G20 Summit in London. The summit also allowed Sarkozy and 
Merkel to claim a victory in front of their domestic audiences, proclaiming that the world had 
turned the page on a dominant model of Anglo-Saxon capitalism. However, the content of the 
agreement reached in London on hedge funds was certainly closer to the proposal endorsed at the 
domestic level by British and American regulators in the lead-up to the summit than to the 
French and German proposals. British and American authorities supported international 
coordination because this allowed them to create a playing level field and to address the concerns 
raised by their respective financial industries that regulation could push financial jobs away from 
London and New York. Similar to the first time that hedge funds were brought into the 
international agenda after the collapse of LTCM, international regulatory coordination allowed 
British and American authorities to secure their domestic approach as the model to be followed 
internationally and to deflect the calls for more stringent regulatory solutions. Unlike in the 
aftermath of the collapse of LTCM, this time the much wider impact of the crisis on their 
domestic politics determined the shift in the content of international regulation from self-
regulation to direct regulation. 
 





Turning to the case of derivatives markets, during the first phase of the current financial crisis, 
the international regulatory response also initially stuck to the past practices of simply 
encouraging private actors to regulate themselves. The FSF’s important report of April 2008 
continued to delegate responsibility to the private sector, noting that “market participants should 
act promptly to ensure that the settlement, legal and operational infrastructure underlying OTC 
derivatives markets is sound” (FSF 2008a: 20). It outlined a number of specific initiatives that 
officials hoped market actors would tackle such as making trading infrastructure more reliable, 
robust and automated as well as incorporating into documentation a “cash settlement protocol” 
that the ISDA had previously developed to replace cumbersome physical settlement procedures 
at the time of defaults. In its October update, the FSF put particular emphasis on the need for 
clearing by a central counterparty (CCP) in the CDS market (FSF 2008b: 3). CCPs reduce 
counterparty risks by acting as an intermediary between the seller and buyer of a contract, 
forcing all participants to put up collateral against their trades which can be drawn upon 
collectively to cover losses if a counterparty collapses. 
 
The first G20 leaders meeting in mid-November 2008 marked the key turning point when official 
regulation of derivatives was endorsed at the international level for the first time. The final 
communiqué said the following:  
 
Supervisors and regulators, building on the imminent launch of central counterparty 
services for credit default swaps (CDS) in some countries, should: speed efforts to reduce 
the systemic risks of CDS and over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives transactions; insist that 
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market participants support exchange traded or electronic trading platforms for CDS 
contracts; expand OTC derivatives market transparency; and ensure that the 
infrastructure for OTC derivatives can support growing volumes. (G20 2008: 4).  
 
This statement squarely placed the responsibility for addressing systemic risks, transparency and 
infrastructural issues relating to derivatives with regulators. Moreover, in the one place where 
market participants were mentioned, the language was no longer voluntary: authorities were told 
to “insist” on market compliance with the use of exchanges or electronic trading platforms for 
CDS (which are an insurance-like derivatives product that promise a payout if there is a default 
on the bond on which the contract was written).  
 
At the subsequent G20 leaders summit in London in early April 2009, the leaders made clear 
their commitment to see CCPs established that were subject to official regulation (G20 2009). 
The G20’s Working Group 1’s report at the time noted that CCPs would have to “meet high 
standards” not just for “risk management” but also for issues that the FSF had raised earlier such 
as “operational arrangements, default procedures” as well as “fair access and transparency” (G20 
Working Group 1, 2009: xvi). A subsequent report from IOSCO in May recommended that 
CCPs for CDS could also help reduce the opacity of the markets through a requirement that they 
“make available transaction and market information that would inform the market and 
regulators” (IOSCO 2009: 32). 
 
It remained a little unclear the extent to which market participants would be forced to use CCPs. 
The G20’s Working Group 1 noted simply that “national authorities should enhance incentives 
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as needed for the use of central counterparties to clear OTC credit derivatives” (G20 Working 
Group 1: xvi). Similarly, when endorsing the use of CCPs for non-CDS OTC derivatives as well, 
the Group noted that “if needed, some incentives may be provided by national authorities, for 
example, by taking a higher capital charge for transactions not cleared through central 
counterparties.” (G20 Working Group 1: 30). The G20 also reverted to the language of 
delegation to the private sector in promoting the idea that contracts should be standardized in 
order to increase transparency and boost CCP use: “We call on the industry to develop an action 
plan on standardization by autumn 2009” (G20 2009: 3). In addition, an IOSCO report in May 
simply stated its objective to “encourage” market actors to standardize CDS contracts (IOSCO 
2009: 31). 
 
The Role of the United States 
 
While these various developments did not go as far as some wanted, the official international 
endorsement of public regulation was an important step. How do we explain it? As in the hedge 
funds case, a key part of the answer was a change in domestic politics within the United States, 
where the question of derivatives regulation was politicized to an unprecedented degree. The 
crises involving Bear Stearns in March 2008 and then Lehman Brothers and AIG in September 
highlighted how the OTC CDS market had concentrated risk in large counterparties, some of 
which had very questionable risk management practices. Because of the extensive 
interconnections between these larger counterparties and other institutions via CDS contracts, 
their collapse risked triggering chain reactions. The uncertainties and panic in the markets at this 
time were only compounded by the opacity of the CDS market; no one knew who held specific 
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CDS contracts and what their exposure was. Prominent analysts – such as George Soros (2009) – 
also argued that the sudden collapse of Lehman and AIG had been accelerated by bear raids 
made possible by the fact that CDS contracts offered speculators convenient ways to short bonds 
with limited risk. 
 
These circumstances made derivatives and CDS household names across the US and provoked a 
widespread backlash against the lack of regulation of derivatives markets. In addition to being a 
key channel of contagion in the crisis, derivatives more generally were criticized for having 
helped generate the economic bubble that lead up to the crisis in the first place by enabling 
excessive leverage and the hiding of risks (Morris 2008: 135; Soros 2008). The sudden spike in 
energy and food prices in the summer of 2008 also highlighted the growing size of speculative 
activity – relative to regular hedging – in commodities futures markets and its potential 
contribution to price volatility and distortion. In addition, some now suggested that CDS 
contracts – especially “unattached” contracts where the holder did not own the underlying asset – 
distorted incentives by encouraging creditors to push for defaults in order to activate their CDS 
contracts (Tett 2009, Sender 2009). Finally, many began to highlight how the opacity and 
complexity of many OTC derivatives markets facilitated the circumvention of taxes and 
regulations, as well as leaving investors reliant for price and trading information on the large 
dealers who were able to derive excessive profits from their asymmetric access to information 
(Whalen 2009, Das 2009).  
 
These various critiques attracted the attention of many in Congress. Beginning in the fall of 
2008, bills began to be debated in Congress to regulate derivatives markets, including provisions 
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to force all OTC derivatives onto exchanges (in order to boost standardization and transparency) 
and to empower regulators to ban the use of unattached derivatives. Bush administration officials 
were supportive of some of the initiatives being promoted in Congress not just because of their 
tactical recognition of the degree of Congressional and public concern. A genuine ideational shift 
took place among key US officials in the context of the crisis. Already, in the immediate wake of 
the March 2008 Bear Stearns crisis, they had begun to push industry very hard to create CCPs, 
particularly for the OTC CDS market. US officials also urged more use of automation and 
electronic trading, greater standardization of contracts, the cancellation (or “compression”) of 
outstanding CDS contracts that offset each other, and the hard wiring of the ISDA cash 
settlement protocol into documentation. Then, on the day before the November G20 summit, 
they announced detailed regulatory objectives for the OTC derivatives markets, some of which 
went beyond the subsequent G20 statement in their specificity and/or goals such as: 1) required 
public reporting of prices, trading volumes and aggregate open interest for CDS, 2) access for 
regulators to trade and position information regarding CDS at CCPs and central trade 
repositories (with one objective being that of “preventing market manipulation”), 3) standards 
(particularly regarding risk management) for regulated entities that transact in OTC derivatives, 
and 4) review by regulatory agencies to determine if they have adequate enforcement authority to 
police against “fraud and market manipulation” (PWG 2008). 
 
The new Obama administration then targeted derivatives as its first major financial regulatory 
initiative, announcing an agenda in May 2009 which again went well beyond the G20 summit 
commitments made in London or Washington. In addition to reiterating many of the provisions 
above, the agenda promised: 1) mandatory use of CCPs for all standardized OTC derivatives and 
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registration for all other trades, 2) requirements for capital, reporting, initial margins and 
business conduct for all OTC dealers “and all other firms who create large exposures to 
counterparties”, 3) mandatory trade on exchanges and electronic trade execution systems for 
standardized contracts, and encouragement of all regulated institutions to make more use of 
exchange-trade derivatives, and 4) rules allowing for position limits to be imposed on OTC 
derivatives that influence price discovery with respect to futures markets (US Government 
2009a). A number of the prominent officials in the Obama administration had been involved in 
the effort to prevent derivatives regulation in the late 1990s and they now acknowledged their 
change of heart on the issue (Chung 2009, Hirsh and Thomas 2009). Even those out of office 
admitted their mistakes from that era, including Alan Greenspan who acknowledged in October 
2008 that he had been “partially” wrong to oppose regulation of CDS (quoted in Das 2009; for 
others, see Hirsh and Thomas 2009). 
 
The shift in US policy also reflected a change in the position of the private sector. After 
steadfastly insisting for over twenty years that self-regulation was adequate, leading US 
derivatives dealers swung around to back mandatory regulation in November 2008 and began to 
develop proposals for Congress. The endorsement of regulation partly reflected recognition of 
the strength of political momentum in favour of regulation within the US as well as the broader 
weakness in the political position of financial interests at this time (including the fact that many 
top dealer banks were now recipients of extensive state support). If regulation was to happen, 
they needed to try to shape its direction (Labaton and Calmes 2009). Many in the industry were 
especially concerned to head off any ban on unattached CDS contracts, which made up as much 
as 80% of CDS trades according to some estimates (Grant and Tait 2009b). The large banks 
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involved in OTC markets (on both the buy and sell side) also had good reason to oppose forced 
moves to exchanges for all OTC contracts since this would erode the high profit margins they 
earned on the transactions. If regulation was to come, the dealers preferred to focus on the use of 
CCPs which enabled dealers to retain their central place in the market (Bullock and Mackenzie 
2008, Tett, van Duyn, and Grant 2009). 
 
Industry’s endorsement of regulation was not entirely defensive. Leading figures in the private 
sector argued that many of the changes being promoted by policymakers were in the long-term 
material interest of the derivatives industry given the economic costs experienced during the 
crisis (e.g. CRMPG III 2008: 15). In the short-term, the introduction of CCPs also promised to 
reduce operating costs for banks (Bullock and Mackenzie 2008, Alexander and Schoenholtz 
2008). Investors had also long favoured the kinds of infrastructural reforms that regulators were 
now pushing since they promised to bring greater efficiency and transparency to the dealer-
dominated markets. Recognizing this, US regulators in fact pressured dealers successfully to 
improve the representation of investors in the governance of trading and settlement issues 
through the ISDA (Mackenzie, Bullock and Tett 2009. See also van Duyn 2009). Other “pro-
change” private interests were the exchanges which had long hoped to lure the OTC business 
away from the New York banker/dealers to their facilities. While the regulators’ push for 
exchange trading obviously met their applause, the exchanges also supported even the more 
limited move of forcing the use of CCPs because many saw the clearing business as one of their 
more promising growth areas of the future. Indeed, very soon after regulators began to push 
CCPs for CDS, four of the world’s largest exchanges were actively developing proposals of this 
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kind, three of which involved US interests (van Duyn and Gangahar 2009, Tett, van Duyn and 
Grant 2009).1 
 
Although the derivatives industry had come around to support the principle of official OTC 
derivatives regulation, its preference was for a form of regulation that was flexible and which 
delegated the details and implementation to the private sector. Its considerable success in 
resisting more heavy-handed and detailed forms of regulation was a function of the fact that it 
showed an ability – as it had in the past – to respond to policymakers’ concerns. Since the start of 
the crisis, ISDA and other industry groups pushed the sector to develop CCPs, improve 
infrastructural deficiencies, and accelerate compression of CDS contracts. ISDA also showcased 
its capacity for private international rule-making by developing a Big Bang protocol that was 
implemented by more than 1400 banks and asset managers in April 2009, and which 
incorporated the cash settlement protocol into CDS contracts, eliminated time lags in protection 
coverage from the moment of purchase, and streamlined contracts for single-named CDS 
(Mackenzie, Bullock and Tett 2009).  
 
The Role of Europe 
 
The unilateral tightening of regulation in the US created a competitive opportunity for European 
financial institutions to capture market share in the highly mobile global derivatives business and 
for London, in particular, to strengthen its position as the most important financial center for the 
trading of OTC derivatives. Instead of rejecting international regulatory coordination to reap the 
competitive advantages, however, European policymakers backed the international regulatory 
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agenda at the Washington G20 summit and after. The reason was quite simple: they too had 
already begun moving towards tighter regulation unilaterally at this time, albeit at a slower and 
more uneven pace than their US counterparts. European officials were discussing the need for 
CCPs as early as July 2008 and by October, the European Commission and European Central 
Bank (ECB) were actively encouraging industry to build a CCP in Europe for CDS. The 
European Parliament and European Commission had also been discussing legislative initiatives 
to address other issues raised by OTC derivatives, such as the need for more transparency (Tait 
2009). In July 2009, the European Commission (2009) launched a process of public consultation 
around goals which were quite similar to many of the US initiatives, such as promoting 
standardization, CCPs for OTC derivatives, central data repositories, information disclosure, and 
greater use of exchanges. This consultation will be followed by concrete initiatives, including 
legislative ones where necessary. 
 
Europe’s initiatives were driven by similar domestic pressures as those in the US. European 
financial institutions had been afflicted by many of the same problems as their US counterparts, 
and they had also been highly exposed to the Lehman and AIG crises. In this context, the issue of 
derivatives regulation had become increasingly politicized within many European countries and 
European policymakers had become increasingly sceptical of the lack of regulation of derivatives 
markets. This scepticism was apparent in the February 2009 de Larosière report commissioned 
by the European Commission which called for the creation of at least one CCP for OTC CDS in 
the EU that would be regulated, and for the simplification and standardization of most OTC 
derivatives, as well as “appropriate risk-mitigation techniques plus transparency measures” 




The shift in attitudes also took place among British officials who historically had been 
particularly keen to defend the competitive position of London’s financial sector. The content of 
March 2009 Turner report was particularly striking for the thoroughness of its critiques of 
derivatives. In addition to calls for compression and CCPs for standardized CDS contracts, the 
report also went into considerable detail critiquing the pro-cyclicality of OTC derivatives 
markets and asked whether it might be necessary to address this by regulating collateral margins 
in OTC derivatives contracts (FSA 2009: 22, 24, 82). The Turner report also insisted strongly 
that the option of directly constraining CDS products must remain on the table (FSA 2009: 110). 
A subsequent report from the UK Treasury (2009) in July 2009 was less pointed in its critiques 
but it also echoed many of the official goals set out by the US and the European Commission. 
 
Although London financial interests accepted some regulation (such as those involving CCPs), 
they resisted other initiatives vigorously. As in the United States, proposals to move OTC 
business to exchanges fueled tensions between dealers and exchanges, with the London 
interdealer brokers strongly opposing any such move which would threaten their core business 
(see for example WMBA 2009). As in the case of hedge funds, London-based financial interests 
also expressed concerns about the regulatory initiatives unfolding in the continent, with the ECB 
and European Commission discussing the possibility to require at least one CCP to be located, 
regulated and supervised in the EU for CDS on European reference entities (and indices based on 
these entities). This latter initiative was driven by European authorities’ desire to avoid European 
dependence on US regulators that would result if all OTC derivatives clearing took place in the 
US (Grant and Tait 2009a). But London interests – backed by the ISDA – preferred to see global 
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clearers rather than required regional ones. Their concerns only grew when it was revealed that 
the Banque de France was pushing for a more exclusive euro-zone CCP as a way of helping 
Paris financial markets prevent “an increase in the weight of the London financial market” 
(quoted in Grant 2009. For London and British concerns, see for example Jones 2009; FSA 
2009: 83). In the end, however, nine ISDA members (including Barclays Capital), along with the 
European Banking Federation, backed down and committed to use a EU-based CCP for eligible 
CDS by July 31, 2009 when confronted by the threat of legislative action from the European 
Parliament, backed by the Commission, to impose higher capital requirements against uncleared 
contracts. 
 
Having set out down the road of endorsing direct regulation, European authorities shared the 
same interest as US policymakers in international regulatory coordination. International 
coordination would help to ensure that European and American goals were not undermined by 
externalities stemming from unregulated markets elsewhere (see for example High Level Group 
2009: 25, 60). International coordination also addressed competitive concerns. In the past, 
policymakers and participants in the derivatives markets on both sides of the Atlantic were able 
to thwart regulatory initiatives by highlighting that such initiatives would undermine the 
competitive position of London and New York. Competitiveness concerns were certainly raised 
by industry and by officials during discussions this time around (see for example Grant and Tait 
2009b). But given the overwhelming domestic political momentum behind regulation, these 
arguments now pushed regulators towards coordinating regulation internationally in order to 
maintain a level playing field between the American and European industry. For policymakers 
from countries such as France and Germany (as well as many developing countries), the G20 
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commitments also helped to “lock in” the new British and US commitment to regulation. More 
generally, given the very public nature of the G20 summits, international coordination provided 





Because they have fallen outside of the ambit of international public regulation, hedge funds and 
derivatives markets have often been invoked as evidence that global financial markets have 
outgrown the capacity of states to adequately regulate and supervise them. Moreover, since 
private industry groups, rather than public authorities, had emerged as key rule-makers for these 
markets, these two sectors seemingly strengthened arguments about the rise of private 
transnational authorities. The current global financial crisis has challenged these lines of thought 
as states have now asserted their regulatory authority in an internationally coordinated manner 
over these two sectors. As Louis Pauly (2002) anticipated back in 2002, the crisis has revealed 
that it is public – not private – authorities that provide the ultimate political foundation for global 
financial markets. 
 
We have argued that the absence of international public regulation in these two sectors before the 
crisis simply reflected the preferences of the two dominant financial powers of the day: the 
United States and Britain. Those preferences, in turn, stemmed primarily from the interests of 
private financial groups, competitiveness concerns, and the ideas of key elite policymakers about 
the superiority of market discipline and self-regulatory mechanisms. When the shockwaves 
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generated by current financial crisis triggered a shift in domestic politics in the leading financial 
powers, the content of international rules changed accordingly. The unprecedented politicization 
of financial regulatory politics triggered by large-scale use of taxpayers’ money to rescue 
financial institutions unleashed popular and legislative pressures in the US and Europe for 
policymakers to regulate. Elite policymakers also shifted their ideas about the merits of market 
discipline and self-regulation in light of lessons learned during the crisis. Many in the private 
financial sector also came to favour regulation both for defensive reasons at a moment of 
weakened political legitimacy and for more positive reasons of improving the functioning of 
their industry, restoring confidence, and/or gaining market shares. As the leading states moved 
for domestic reasons towards stronger official regulation, they had important reasons – as noted 
above – to make sure that the content of international rules changed in the same direction. 
 
At a theoretical level, this analysis points towards the centrality of domestic politics in leading 
states as a key driver of international regulatory change in finance. The degree of domestic 
politicization of financial regulatory issues triggered by the crisis also suggests that domestic-
level explanations of international regulatory politics need to analyze the international regulatory 
preferences of a wider range of societal actors than just the financial sector. The cases also reveal 
how industry preferences are more complicated, context-specific, and heterogeneous than many 
theoretical models suggest. In addition, these two episodes suggest the need to move beyond 
purely rationalist interest-based analyses to incorporate the role of ideational shifts both at the 




The centrality of domestic politics highlighted by these two episodes has some important 
implications for other analytical perspectives on the politics of international financial regulation. 
While transnationalist perspectives may help to explain the initial response to the crisis up until 
the fall of 2008, we believe that the politicization of regulatory issues within the domestic arena 
after that point undermined the strength of this analytical perspective. The autonomy of 
transgovernmental networks of regulators became increasingly constrained by their domestic 
political systems, and the priorities of international financial industry associations became 
challenged by domestic political pressures. 
 
Analyses focusing on inter-state power relations might be tempted to interpret the end of self-
regulation as a product of the decline of US and British power and the success of states with 
more interventionist preferences such as France and Germany in overcoming their opposition. In 
our view, however, this interpretation would neglect the significance of the domestic changes in 
the US and Britain in explaining the shift to direct regulation. At the same time, we do believe 
that analysts focusing on inter-state power relations would be right to identify the growing 
capacity of the European Union to act collectively both unilaterally and at the international level 
as significant development in this story (see Posner, Chapter 7 in this volume). As we have 
shown, this change increasingly constrained Britain’s autonomy in international regulatory 
politics, while strengthening the ability of countries such as France and Germany, as well as 





As a final comment, let us return to the title of this paper: is this the end of self-regulation? The 
answer is certainly yes in the sense that public authorities have accepted formal responsibility 
over the regulation of derivatives markets and hedge funds. But it is noteworthy that they have so 
far refrained from endorsing heavy handed and detailed kinds of international regulation such as 
limits on the use of any derivatives products or constraints on the investment strategies of hedge 
funds. Public authorities are also continuing to rely on several elements of self-regulation, 
particularly in the case of derivatives. Whether these patterns will endure remains an open 
question. If the domestic pressures generated by the crisis fade away and competitive concerns 
raised by the industry regain strength, regulators in major financial centers will come under 
pressure to scale back the perimeter of public regulation and to revert to more market-driven 
regulatory mechanisms. If, however, the lessons of the crisis trigger a deeper ideational shift or 
the coalitions of private sector interests who stand to gain from greater regulation become 
institutionalized, then the movement away from self-regulation may endure and could even 
intensify in the coming years. 
 
 
                                                          
1The fourth exchange was Eurex Clearing which is jointly operated by Deutsche Börse and SIX 
Swiss Exchange. 
